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Measuring Individual Risk Attitudes when Preferences are 
Imprecise 
 
By Graham Loomes and Ganna Pogrebna 
 
 
Abstract  
 
There is widespread interest in measuring risk attitudes and incorporating such 
measures into broader econometric analyses. We consider three elicitation 
procedures currently in use. We find considerable variability within – and even more, 
between – the results they produce. We suggest that this reflects the way that 
different instruments interact with imprecise underlying preferences. The short run 
implication is that such procedures need to be used with caution and are likely to be 
highly context-specific. The longer run implication is that adding ‘white noise’ to 
deterministic models is inadequate: we need to develop models that allow for 
imprecision and procedural variation.   
 
Keywords: risk attitude, risk aversion, preference elicitation, procedural invariance 
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1. Introduction  
 
A number of recent studies into decision making under risk and over time have used 
various instruments to measure individual risk attitudes and discount rates. The idea 
is that such measures could be used to help explain and predict other decisions (such 
as choice of investment, insurance policy, pension scheme). This paper investigates 
the within- and between-procedural robustness of three such instruments when 
used to elicit risk attitudes. We find degrees of variability and disparity that are 
difficult to explain within the terms of any deterministic model, although it may be 
easier to understand at least some of the diversity and discrepancies if we allow that 
preferences are imprecise and that responses may, at least in part, be shaped by the 
procedures used to elicit them. 
 
The three procedures which are the focus of this paper will be referred to as the 
choice list procedure, the ranking procedure and the allocation procedure. We shall 
describe each in detail in the course of the paper, but the essence of each is as 
follows. 
 
The choice list (sometimes called multiple price list) method presents a table of 
binary choices designed so that as a respondent works through the table she can be 
expected to switch at some point from one ‘side’ to the other. When the choices are 
between risky alternatives, the switching point is assumed to be indicative of the 
individual’s risk attitude. 
 
The ranking procedure presents a set of options and asks the respondent to identify 
which option she ranks top. When applied to a set of risky prospects that have 
different combinations of spread and return, the idea is to identify the individual’s 
risk attitude as reflected in her most-preferred balance between mean and variance. 
The allocation procedure provides the respondent with a budget and allows her to 
distribute it between different state-contingent claims. When applied to risk, the 
chosen allocation, in conjunction with information about the rate of exchange 
between claims, should allow the individual’s risk attitude to be inferred. 
 
The data generated by any of the above procedures are normally interpreted with 
respect to expected utility theory (EUT) or some other deterministic theory, with the 
analysis allowing for some form of ‘white noise’ in people’s responses. One needs to 
allow for within-person variability because, ever since the earliest experiments tried 
to elicit individuals’ preferences, it has been known that if we present an individual 
with some set of decision tasks and repeat each question at several points within the 
same experimental session
1
, we are likely to observe that individual giving a different 
answer to exactly the same question on at least some occasions (see Mosteller and 
Nogee, 1951, for an early example; a number of more recent studies are discussed in 
Bardsley et al., 2009, Chapter 7). So it has become standard practice to analyse 
responses on the basis that if an individual behaves according to Theory X, his/her 
true preferences are given by some deterministic ‘core’ parameters, with any 
particular observation liable to diverge from the true preference due to some 
                                                 
1
 Some experiments have involved repeating the tasks in different sessions separated by short periods 
of time (intended to be too short for individuals’ preferences to have changed in any substantial way). 
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random noise, with the choice of error specification often being a matter of 
convention and convenience.  
 
Such an approach raises two issues. One – which we note, but which is not the focus 
of this paper – is that different assumptions about the error term may produce quite 
different conclusions about the performance of different core theories – see Stott 
(2006) and Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2010) for examples. The second issue, which is 
the motivation for this paper, is that the ‘deterministic-core-plus-white-noise’ 
formulation may be inappropriate and inadequate. 
 
If the standard formulation were a reasonably good assumption, we should expect 
that responses to different questions within the same procedure should all be 
consistent with approximately the same core model and whatever risk attitude it 
entails, and that different procedures should yield much the same picture for any 
particular individual. 
 
However, there is a substantial and wide-ranging body of evidence that casts doubt 
on such suppositions. In particular, there are many manifestations of ‘framing’ 
effects and failures of procedural invariance such that when ostensibly the same 
choice or decision task is presented in different formats or using different 
procedures, response patterns are systematically different. Kahneman and Tversky 
(2000) provide a collection of studies of such phenomena which are robust to 
replication. 
 
One possible way of explaining both within-person variability and systematic 
between-procedure differences is to model responses to decision tasks not simply as 
the direct revelation of fully-formed ‘true’ preferences plus exogenous white noise 
but more as the result of some deliberative process whereby an individual draws on 
a substratum of possible values and preferences to construct a response. 
 
Such an explanation is in the spirit of Simon’s (1978) invocation to economists to 
develop models of procedural rationality by borrowing from neighbouring disciplines 
which have studied decision making processes. For example, there is a body of 
psychological and neuroscientific literature which models decisions as being arrived 
at after some neural ‘accumulator’ or ‘sequential sampling’ process (for a survey, see 
Otter et al., 2008; for an early and influential example applied to risky choice, see 
Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993). Instead of assuming, as deterministic models do, 
that an individual comes to a decision with a single precise set of subjective values, 
accumulator models suppose that it is as if past experiences have laid down 
distributions of such values. The process of reaching a decision is then modelled as if 
an individual samples repeatedly from these underlying distributions, building up 
subjective arguments for and against different options, with this mental sampling 
continuing until the balance of subjective feelings in favour of one option or another 
tips the individual to make a decision.  
 
Models of this kind have several implications. First, they can accommodate the 
stochastic nature of decisions. It is easy to imagine cases where the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of competing options are such that the sampling 
process sometimes produces a balance in favour of one option and sometimes tips 
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the balance in favour of another, even when the options have been presented in 
exactly the same way. Such models can thereby provide an account of the variability 
of decisions when the same task is presented in exactly the same way on different 
occasions.  
 
Second, such models can explain why an individual may take different amounts of 
time to process different decisions within the same format. For example, in binary 
choices where the alternatives are quite evenly balanced, it may require more 
sampling (i.e., take longer) to reach a decision and the probabilities of each being 
chosen may be in the vicinity of 0.5; whereas if one option is then improved relative 
to the other, it will be likely to be chosen more often and less time will be required 
to make that decision. Such a relationship between response times and choice 
probabilities is well-established (Jamieson and Petrusic, 1977; Moffatt, 2005), but it 
cannot easily be explained by a standard ‘deterministic-core-plus-white-noise 
model’. 
 
Third, such models may help to explain people’s ability to recognise – up to a point, 
at least – their own uncertainty about their preferences. For example, Butler and 
Loomes (2007) asked individuals to respond to a series of binary choices where one 
option was held constant and the other was progressively changed. Every time the 
variable option changed, participants were asked to state which option they chose 
and whether they definitely preferred it or thought they preferred it but were not 
sure. From the perspective of standard deterministic models, it is hard to know what 
sense to make of such responses. Yet most participants found the question 
meaningful and were able to report ‘imprecision intervals’ where they were less than 
completely sure about their preferences. This is consistent with an accumulator 
process where the individual terminates sampling before he is completely confident 
about his decision. 
 
Fourth, uncertainty about their preferences may make people susceptible to various 
procedural or contextual influences. Indeed, Butler and Loomes (2007) found that 
both ends of the reported imprecision intervals, as well as the point of switching 
between the two options, were liable to be influenced by various features of the 
procedure that standard economic models would regard as theoretically irrelevant.
 2
 
However, it seems quite possible that the nature and framing of the decision task 
could systematically influence the sampling process and hence affect the patterns of 
response that result.  
 
But how much do the possibilities outlined above really matter when it comes to 
eliciting measures of risk attitude? The answer depends on whether any interactions 
between the different procedures and people’s deliberative processes result in 
systematic effects that are strong enough to undermine the generality and 
transferability of the measures we elicit. If the effects exist but are small and are 
counterbalanced by a number of other effects that offset or submerge them, we 
might operate on the basis that the combination of such effects can be adequately 
approximated by some standard error specification. On the other hand, if the effects 
                                                 
2
 For one subsample, the variable option started undesirable and progressively improved; for the other 
subsample, it started highly desirable and become progressively worse. 
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are powerful and highly context-dependent, we might want to be more cautious 
about supposing transferability from one context to another and we might put 
greater research effort into trying to develop procedural models which can 
accommodate such data. 
 
To investigate these issues, we conducted an experiment designed to provide data 
about the amount of within-procedure variability and also about the extent of 
consistency or inconsistency between the three procedures under examination. To 
this end, we recruited 423 students from the University of Warwick who completed a 
set of 20 decision tasks which, between them, involved examples of all three 
procedures. Detailed information about the experiment and its implementation can 
be found online
3
 and in the Supplementary Material, but the key features will be 
described more fully when each procedure is discussed in the relevant sections 
below. 
 
Our results add considerably to the available evidence about the extent to which 
elicited measures of risk attitude, as conventionally defined, depend upon and vary 
with the particular questions asked within a given procedure. The results also 
suggest that even after allowing for within-procedure variability, there is substantial 
evidence that different procedures produce different patterns of response that are 
difficult – we think, impossible – to reconcile with a ‘deterministic-core-plus-white-
noise’ approach. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2, 3 and 4 we describe the 
experimental design relating to each elicitation procedure and discuss what the data 
may tell us about the extent to which we can rely on that particular procedure to 
deliver reasonably consistent measures of risk attitudes.
 4
 For all three procedures, 
the experimental payoffs are sums of money contingent on the realisation of single-
stage random mechanisms where the likelihoods are clearly specified in a format 
comparable across procedures. Having looked at each procedure separately, Section 
5 makes comparisons between them and discusses the nature and extent of the 
systematic differences we find. In Section 6, we consider implications which our 
results might have for future applications and directions of research. 
 
 
2. The Choice List Procedure 
 
2.1 Motivation 
This procedure presents respondents with a table or list which constitutes an 
ordered series of pairs of options constructed in such a way that the point where an 
individual switches from one side of the table to the other is taken to identify a 
range within which the individual’s point of indifference is located and from which a 
measure of the individual’s risk attitude can be derived. 
 
                                                 
3
 Links to the experimental design are provided in Section 2. 
4
 In order to focus on the main features of the experiment and the data generated, we provide the finer 
details of instructions and implementation in Appendix A, together with some additional analysis.  
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The choice list task has been used by many researchers for one purpose or another. 
An early example can be found in Cohen et al. (1987): they presented a particular 
lottery – e.g., a 0.25 chance of receiving 1,000 French Francs – and asked participants 
to consider a series of sure alternatives with increments of 50FF between them, in 
order to identify certainty equivalents. Tversky and Kahneman (1992, pp. 305-306) 
used a similar procedure in two stages, with the first stage offering seven widely 
spaced sure amounts against a given lottery and the second stage offering more 
finely gradated sums in the region where the first-stage switch had occurred. More 
recently, Holt and Laury (2002) – henceforth H&L – constructed tables where there 
were two-outcome lotteries on both sides of the table and where all payoffs were 
held constant while the probabilities were changed progressively in such a way that 
the preference could be expected to switch between one end of the table and the 
other. Such lists – or variants of them – have become popular in many studies since 
then. 
 
In a world of reasonably robust deterministic preferences, this instrument could be 
expected to work quite well: if core preferences are consistent with EUT and if 
deviations in the form of switching a little too early or a little too late are due simply 
to white noise, two or three such choice lists should be sufficient to provide decent 
estimates of risk attitudes at the individual level and a good picture of the 
distribution of such measures in any sample.  
 
However, there are two reasons for being cautious about operating on that basis: 
first, the doubt that EUT is the appropriate core model; and second, the imprecision 
of people’s responses to such tasks and their vulnerability to procedural effects. 
  
On the first issue, Cohen et al. (1987, p. 10) note that when choice lists are used to 
elicit certainty equivalents for a variety of lotteries, “the instability of risk attitudes is 
striking”. Tversky and Kahneman (1992, Tables 3 and 4) provide similar evidence of 
how median responses vary from risk averse to risk seeking as the nature of the 
lotteries changes. Of course, such evidence does not by itself refute the 
‘deterministic-core-plus-white-noise’ formulation: indeed, both sets of authors 
interpret their results as demonstrating the inadequacy of EUT as the core theory, 
proposing instead that some form of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) provides a better core model, to which a conventional 
error term might well be added). An important lesson to be learned from these 
studies, however, is that taking just one or two choice list tables as a basis for 
eliciting measures of risk attitude and then extrapolating those measures to other 
choices is an unsafe way of proceeding. Notwithstanding such evidence, it has 
become common practice to rely on just one or two tables interpreted on the basis 
of EUT as the core theory.
5
 
 
                                                 
5
 For a recent example, see Brown and Kim (2013). In the manner of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
they use a two-step (coarser-finer) procedure but rely entirely on just one set of payoffs along the lines 
of Holt and Laury (2002) and assume EUT with constant relative risk aversion. Despite citing Cohen et 
al. (1987) as an early example of the choice list procedure, they make no reference to the concerns 
raised there about the use of EUT and the instability of EUT-based measures of risk attitude. No 
reference at all is made to Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
 10 
 
 
On the second issue, there is some evidence of imprecision in responses to choice 
lists. Cohen et al. (1987) provided the opportunity for respondents to identify values 
where they either considered the alternatives to be equivalent or else where they 
did not know which alternative they preferred (in which case they let the 
experimenter make the choice for them). If an individual identified at least two 
adjacent values in any one list, Cohen et al. registered a positive “indecision 
interval”. With increments of 50FF, they found up to 10% of respondents reporting 
such indecision. 
  
Dubourg et al. (1997) used lists to elicit willingness to pay for safety improvements, 
asking respondents to identify the largest amounts they felt sure they would be 
prepared to pay (call this WTPmin), the smallest amounts they were certain they 
would not pay (WTPmax) and, if those two amounts differed, the sum that they felt 
would make it hardest to decide whether to pay or not. They not only found 
substantial intervals between WTPmax and WTPmin but also noted that the size and 
position of those intervals was systematically affected by the ranges of values 
presented in the lists, sometimes to the extent that the average WTPmin elicited via a 
list with a larger range was higher than the average WTPmax elicited via a list with a 
smaller range.  
 
More recently, Cubitt et al. (2013) elicited certainty equivalents and associated 
imprecision intervals using lists that were rather more fine-grained than those in 
Cohen et al. (1987) and they found imprecision to be pervasive, with an average of 
87% of respondents identifying at least some interval. They did not test for the kinds 
of range effects reported by Dubourg et al. (1997) but they established the existence 
and persistence of imprecision across a broad range of lotteries of the kind widely 
used in incentivised experiments. 
 
Of course, the fact that imprecision can be identified in choice list tasks does not 
necessarily mean that they are vulnerable to procedural effects. But Lévy-Garboua et 
al. (2012) consider several different variations of the H&L procedure and find that 
different ways of presenting the tables produce different patterns of risk attitudes 
and different degrees of internal inconsistency. So we set out to examine both the 
variability of estimated risk attitudes across different parameter sets and also the 
susceptibility of responses to a basic consistency test: namely, whether simply 
inverting the list makes any systematic difference to the distributions we infer.
6
  
 
2.2 Design 
We constructed five different lists, each constituting a separate decision task 
(henceforth, DT), varying the parameters of the choices in ways we shall explain 
shortly. We randomised our sample of participants so that about half saw the lists of 
choices ordered in one way – version 1 (henceforth V1) – while the other half (V2) 
saw exactly the same sets of choices, but presented ‘upside down’.
7
 
                                                 
6
 By keeping the range of the table the same and also keeping all of the increments between rows the 
same and as uniformly spread as possible, we control for any ‘range-frequency’ effects of the kind 
identified in many experiments since Parducci (1965). 
7
 Both versions of the experiment are available online via 
https://columbia.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9GH9H9WSptIYgJK (variation V1) and 
https://columbia.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_1Mte22jrFxXKYJu (variation V2). 
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Figure 1: An Example of a Decision Task Display in the Choice List Procedure 
 
Figure 1 shows how a list was presented. Here we show the final DT in the 
experiment, varying the lotteries on both sides in the style used by H&L. Our display 
was intended to make it easy for participants to see what the lotteries involved, how 
they compared with each other and how they changed from one row to the next. For 
the first two rows, the left-hand option offers the higher expected value (EV), while 
for the other eight rows the right-hand option offers the higher EV, with the 
difference between EVs increasing as we go down the list. Thus if someone chooses 
the right-hand option throughout, or else switches from left to right after the first 
row, she may be regarded as risk-seeking. If she switches between the second and 
third row, she may be judged approximately risk neutral. Switching below the third 
row is taken to signify risk aversion, with lower switching points indicating greater 
risk aversion. 
Besides the DT shown in Figure 1, there were four other choice list tasks. Two of 
these were ‘certainty equivalent’ tasks where a particular lottery was held constant 
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on one side and on the other side the option of a sure sum of money was varied – in 
our cases, from £1 to £10 inclusive by £1 increments. For DT16, the fixed lottery 
offered a 0.6 chance of £10 and a 0.4 chance of 0; while for DT18, the fixed lottery 
gave a 0.2 chance of £18 and a 0.8 chance of £3.  
 
The other two tasks took a ‘lottery equivalent’ form. In these cases, the sure sums of 
money on one side were held constant while on the other side a lottery offered two 
payoffs with the probabilities of the higher payoff varying by increments of 0.1 while 
the probability of the lower payoff reduced accordingly. For DT17, the sure amount 
was fixed at £8, with the alternative offering £18 with probability p and £3 with 
probability 1-p; while for DT19, all payoffs were £3 lower – that is, the fixed certainty 
of £5 was juxtaposed to (£15, p; 0, 1-p). 
 
The incentive mechanism was straightforward: if a choice list question were selected 
to be the basis for payment, one row of the list would be picked at random and the 
participant would be given the option she had chosen from that pair and be paid 
according to how that option played out. 
 
One feature of our experimental design worth bearing in mind when considering the 
results is that, within each procedure, participants were asked to answer all tasks of 
that kind and were then invited to review any earlier responses and make any 
adjustments they wished before confirming their complete set of answers to all DTs 
of the same kind. This was intended to give participants every opportunity to make 
their responses cohere in any respect they thought fit (but on the understanding that 
only one task from the experiment as a whole would form the basis of their payment 
for taking part).
8
 
 
2.3 Results for the Choice List Procedure
9
 
Table 1 reports the distributions of responses for each of the five DTs from the 
choice list procedure, categorising individuals by the number of times they chose the 
sure or safer option in each list
10
 and distinguishing between V1 and V2. So the 
observations in the upper rows are those individuals exhibiting the most risk-seeking 
behaviour and lower rows represent progressively greater risk aversion. The average 
                                                 
8
 In many earlier studies that employed the kind of text format used by H&L, a substantial minority of 
participants exhibited inconsistency in the choice list procedure by switching more than once from one 
side of the table to the other. Crosetto and Filippin (2013) have collected a large meta dataset from 30 
published studies with 4,726 participants. In this meta dataset, 16.3% of participants were inconsistent 
in the choice list procedure. Our display allowed us to significantly decrease the number of such 
inconsistencies: the proportion of inconsistent participants in our dataset ranged between 1.1% in DT19 
to 5.6% in DT20. 
9
 The results in this section and throughout the rest of the main text of this paper are based on 351 
individuals out of a total of 423 who provided responses to the full set of tasks. In Appendix B we 
outline the criteria we used to exclude a participant’s responses. Our criteria were quite demanding 
because we wanted to be able to reassure readers of this paper that none of the main conclusions could 
be driven by a number of outlier responses given by people who might not understand properly what 
they were being asked to do. Appendix C reports the analysis for the full sample of 423 individuals and 
shows that none of the conclusions are significantly altered. Furthermore, in Appendix D, we present 
an example of our analysis for a particular functional form EUT with CRRA and show that our results 
remain robust when we assume a particular functional form. 
10
 The option that was the riskier lottery in nine rows might offer its high payoff with certainty in the 
tenth row, thereby dominating the sure/safer option in this case with a higher sure amount – but here 
this is counted as the choice of the riskier option. 
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number of sure/safer choices is shown at the bottom of each column. To provide a 
benchmark, the rows where a risk-neutral individual could be found are indicated by 
a darker colour. 
 
Table 1 shows that the distributions of responses were indeed liable to be affected 
by something as seemingly arbitrary as which way up the choice lists were displayed. 
There is no particular effect for DT17 or DT19, but for DT16, DT18 and DT20, the 
differences are significant: in all three cases, Mann-Whitney tests reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the distributions at p < 0.01.  
 
The contrasts between DT16 and DT18 are of particular interest, since each task 
involves a lottery with an EV of £6 being compared with sure sums ranging from £1 
to £10 inclusive. Risk aversion might suggest that we should expect more safe 
choices when the lottery has higher variance, as in DT18, and this seems to be the 
case for V1 (p < 0.05); but turning the lists upside down reverses the difference, 
producing a significant tendency (p < 0.01) for V2 respondents to choose the sure 
option less often in DT18 than in DT16.
11
 If responses can be shifted significantly by 
which way up a list is presented, we might want to be cautious about the extent to 
which precise numerical estimates of risk attitude parameters can be derived from 
just one or two list tasks and can then be used to ‘control’ for risk when analysing 
data generated in some rather different context. 
 
Table 1: Distributions of Responses in DT16–DT20 
 DT16 
(£10, 0.6; 0, 0.4) 
vs £10 to £1 
DT17 
(£18, p; £3, 1-p) 
vs £8 
DT18 
(£18, 0.2; £3, 0.8) 
vs £10 to £1 
DT19 
(£15, p; 0, 1-p)  
vs £5 
DT20 
(£8, p; £5, 1-p)  
vs (£20, p; £1, 1-p) 
Sure/Safer V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 
0   - - 1 - 1 1 1 - 2 1 
1  3 - 1 1 - 1 - 2 3 - 
2  1 - 4 6 3 8 6 4 23 25 
3  17 4 40 56 6 17 40 40 42 21 
4  38 36 59 55 31 47 53 61 47 42 
5  53 57 38 36 62 59 32 38 31 43 
6  43 55 22 18 43 26 32 17 20 30 
7  13 21 4 6 26 20 5 11 3 12 
8  3 4 1 1 - - 1 3 - 3 
9 - 1 2 - - - 2 3 1 2 
10 1 1 - - - - - - - - 
Average 
Sure/Safer 
choices 
4.98 5.41 4.31 4.13 5.22 4.73 4.40 4.44 3.88 4.48 
                                                 
11
 The test conducted in these last two cases involves taking, for each individual, the difference 
between the number of times he/she chooses the sure option in each list and testing the null hypothesis 
that this difference is on average zero. 
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We deliberately use very general tests not requiring any particular functional form. 
Often, the responses to such choice lists are used in conjunction with some specific 
assumption about functional form – e.g., EUT with constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) – to generate mid-point estimates of risk attitude parameters. However, if 
such an exercise produces discrepancies, it is open to the objection that the wrong 
specification may have been chosen. To avoid this possible complication, we shall (in 
this and subsequent sections) ask instead how far each individual’s response to one 
DT correlates with their response to a different DT relative to other members of the 
same sample who were shown the list displayed in the same format.  
 
If ‘attitude to risk’ is an individual-level characteristic, we might expect (at least 
within a particular kind of elicitation procedure) that those individuals who exhibit 
more (less) risk aversion than others in one DT would also be likely to exhibit more 
(less) risk aversion than those same other people in a different DT of the same kind. 
We examine this hypothesis in the context of the five choice lists by ranking 
individuals according to their switching points within each list, supposing that if 
individual X is more risk averse than individual Y, X will tend to switch at lower points 
in Table 1 than Y. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the rank correlation coefficients for each pair of tasks within 
each version of the experiment. In most comparisons, the correlations are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, which suggests that there is some broad 
case for thinking of some people as more or less risk averse than others. However, 
the coefficients vary a good deal: they are highest for the two lists we might regard 
as most similar – DT17 and DT19, where DT17 is the same as DT19 except with £3 
added to each payoff – but are often quite low for other pairs where there are more 
differences: for example, between DT16 (where a lottery with a possibility of a zero 
payoff stays fixed while the alternative sure amounts vary) and DT17 (where the sure 
amount is fixed while the alternative lotteries vary the probabilities of two strictly 
positive payoffs). 
 
Table 2 Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, Choice List Procedure, V1 
 DT17 DT18 DT19 DT20 
DT16 0.110 0.202
**
 0.316
***
 0.344
***
 
DT17  0.234
**
 0.645
***
 0.370
***
 
DT18   0.249
**
 0.306
***
 
DT19    0.560
***
 
 
** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 level 
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Table 3: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, Choice List Procedure, V2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 level 
 
If a method of obtaining measures of risk attitude is to be given much credence, one 
might expect it to do better in ranking individuals consistently within the narrow 
domain of lotteries involving no more than two payoffs. 
 
This conclusion might seem rather more pessimistic than the one reached by 
Andersen et al. (2008). In their study, they asked each participant to respond to four 
choice list tasks and declared themselves (p. 591) content to use these responses as 
the basis for estimating CRRA coefficients. However, all four of their lists shared the 
H&L format with payoffs not varying greatly across the lists, so it would not be too 
surprising if they found enough consistency over that range to satisfy themselves. 
Andersen et al. (2008) did not explore how well their estimates extended to other 
structures within the choice list format, as we did; nor did they examine their 
transferability to other kinds of tasks. This is an issue to which we now turn. 
 
 
3. The Ranking Procedure 
 
3.1 Design and Motivation 
Our ranking task is a variant of a procedure used in Binswanger (1980, 1981) and 
further developed by Eckel and Grossman (2002) who used a multiple choice task 
where each participant was asked to select the most preferred lottery out of a set of 
five 50-50 lotteries with different payoffs and expected values. These lotteries were 
shown as rows in a table, with the top row offering a sure amount and subsequent 
lotteries keeping the probabilities fixed while progressively increasing the EV and the 
spread of the payoffs. Those respondents who were most risk averse could opt for 
the certainty, but less risk averse individuals were expected to prefer lotteries lower 
down the table, with the least risk averse (and all risk neutral and risk seeking) 
individuals opting for the lottery in the bottom row, which offered the highest EV.  
 
We modified the Eckel and Grossman (2002) – henceforth E&G – method in two 
ways. First, we increased the number of lotteries in the table from five to six so that 
there was no longer a ‘middle’ item and there was room for finer differentiation of 
attitudes. Second, instead of asking participants just to select one lottery out of six, 
we asked them to rank all lotteries from the most preferred (rank 1) to the least 
preferred (rank 6). This allowed us not only to do what E&G did (by looking at the 
 DT17 DT18 DT19 DT20 
DT16 0.284
***
 0.289
***
 0.313
***
 0.447
***
 
DT17  0.297
***
 0.559
***
 0.464
***
 
DT18   0.225
**
 0.204
**
 
DT19    0.493
***
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top choices), but also to see how far individuals’ responses look consistent with the 
‘single-peakedness’ property often assumed in the modelling of preferences
12
. By 
asking each participant to undertake the task for two different sets of six lotteries, 
we aimed to explore how sensitive responses were to changes in the parameters.  
 
In order to encourage respondents to think carefully about the whole ranking, they 
were told that if one of the questions were selected to be the basis for payment, two 
of the six options would be picked at random and the participant would be given 
whichever of those two options she had ranked higher and be paid according to how 
that option played out. 
 
In a deterministic world, ranking tasks are extensions of binary preferences (so long 
as transitivity holds) and the order in which the options are processed should make 
no difference to the final result. However, if preferences are imprecise, the order in 
which the options are processed or the range of the options or the intervals between 
each alternative may affect the final ranking.  
 
The first of the ranking DTs was the same for every participant. It is shown in Figure 2 
below. 
 
 
Figure 2: Decision Task Display in the First Ranking Task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 This latter issue is discussed more fully in Appendix B: in the main text, we shall focus just on the 
top-ranked options as in Binswanger (1980, 1981) as well as in Eckel and Grossman (2002). 
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However, the second ranking task differed between ‘treatment’ variations, as shown 
in Table 4. For the V1 subsample, the pairs of payoffs in each row were the same as 
in the first ranking task, but the Black:White probability ratio became 0.3:0.7 rather 
than 0.5:0.5, so that the EV rose much more slowly from top row to bottom row 
(increasing from £10.00 to £10.50 in increments of £0.10 rather than from £10.00 to 
£17.50 in increments of £1.50). The conventional wisdom here is that only those 
who are risk seeking or risk neutral (or at most just very slightly risk averse) will rank 
F higher than A, and the only people who should place B, C, D or E first are those 
with sufficient risk aversion to turn down F but not enough risk aversion to prefer A. 
 
 
Table 4: Parameters of the Various Ranking Task Lotteries 
Treatment 
variation 
Decision 
task 
Lottery 
Outcome 
Black  
Outcome 
White EV 
Prob = 0.5 Prob = 0.5 
V1, V2 DT14 
A 10 10 10.0 
B 15 8 11.5 
C 20 6 13.0 
D 25 4 14.5 
E 30 2 16.0 
F 35 0 17.5 
 
   Prob = 0.3 Prob = 0.7  
V1 DT15 
A 10 10 10.0 
B 15 8 10.1 
C 20 6 10.2 
D 25 4 10.3 
E 30 2 10.4 
F 35 0 10.5 
 
   Prob = 0.7 Prob = 0.3  
V2 DT15 
A 10 10 10.0 
B 12 8 10.8 
C 14 6 11.6 
D 16 4 12.4 
E 18 2 13.2 
F 20 0 14.0 
 
For the V2 subsample, the Black:White probability ratio was 0.7:0.3 and the payoffs 
in each row were different divisions of £20, from £10:£10 in the top row to £20:0 in 
the bottom row, with EVs increasing from £10.00 to £14.00 in increments of £0.80. 
As we shall see later, this latter table was intended to provide a direct comparison 
with one of the allocation tasks to be discussed in Section 4. But it is also the case 
that the relationship between the EVs and the variances of the bets is broadly 
comparable with that for DT14, so that, to the extent that measures of risk attitude 
reflect this relationship, we should expect to see those choosing A and B in DT14 
being spread over A, B and C in DT15, with those choosing C and D in DT14 opting for 
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D, E and F in DT15 and those picking E and F in DT14 being expected to opt for F in 
DT15. 
 
3.2 Results for the Ranking Procedure 
As with the choice list procedure, participants could scroll between both ranking 
procedure tasks and adjust their responses to either one in the light of their answers 
to the other. Again, this was intended to allow the opportunity for whatever kind of 
consistency the individual wished to achieve. 
Table 5 reports the numbers of individuals in the V1 subsample putting each option 
at the top of their ranking. 
 
Table 5: 1
st
 Choices in DT14 and DT15, V1 subsample 
DT14 1
st
 Choice DT15 1
st 
Choice 
A: £10 for sure 70 118 A: £10 for sure 
B: £15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 28 22 B: £15, 0.3; £8, 0.7 
C: £20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 23 9 C: £20, 0.3; £6, 0.7 
D: £25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 13 2 D: £25, 0.3; £4, 0.7 
E: £30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 2 2 E: £30, 0.3; £2, 0.7 
F: £35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 36 19 F: £35, 0.3; £0, 0.7 
 
So the direction of movement is much as we should have expected, although of the 
70 who chose the sure option in DT14, 12 moved away to a riskier position in DT15, 
despite those options offering much poorer gains in return for the extra risk. The 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.331 is significant at the 1% level, but is 
arguably quite low (although the preponderance of A choices in both tasks – but 
especially in DT15 – might limit the sensitivity of the coefficient). 
 
For the V2 subsample, the first choice data are shown in Table 6 below. Here too, the 
overall distribution of first choices moves in the expected direction. The Spearman 
rank correlation between DT14 and DT15 is 0.495, which is significant at the 1% level 
and higher than most of the correlations reported so far. However, when we look at 
individual behaviour, there were indications that both A and F may have been 
somewhat oversubscribed in DT14. The 77 who opted for A in DT14 (and therefore 
turned down the mean-variance trade-off in B or beyond) should not on that basis 
have opted for anything riskier than B in DT15; yet 39 of them opted for C, and 
another 17 opted for D, E or F in roughly equal numbers. At the other end of the 
table, all 45 with sufficiently little aversion to risk that they top-ranked F in DT14 
might also have been expected to select F in DT15. However, only 30 did so, with 
another 13 opting for A, B or C. This would be consistent with the possibility that 
imprecise preferences, in conjunction with procedures which start at one end or 
other of the table, may result in disproportionate numbers in those end categories. 
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Table 6: 1
st
 Choices in DT14 and DT15, V2 subsample 
DT14 1
st 
Choice DT15 1
st
 Choice 
A: £10 for sure 77 19 A: £10 for sure 
B: £15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 22 15 B: £12, 0.7; £8, 0.3 
C: £20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 26 67 C: £14, 0.7; £6, 0.3 
D: £25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 5 22 D: £16, 0.7; £4, 0.3 
E: £30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 4 16 E: £18, 0.7; £2, 0.3 
F: £35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 45 40 F: £20, 0.7; £0, 0.3 
 
One noteworthy feature of the DT15 distribution in Table 6 is the mode at option C. 
It is possible that the popularity of that option in this task is due in part to factors 
that we shall see at play in the allocation procedure, which provided the first 
thirteen tasks in the experiment. We focus on that procedure next. 
 
 
4. The Allocation Procedure 
 
4.1 Design and Motivation 
Our experimental examination of the allocation procedure was built on a design 
used in Loomes (1991). Our respondents were given a fixed total sum of money (£20) 
and were invited to allocate it in any way they wished between different possible 
states of the world that are contingent upon the outcome of a well-defined random 
mechanism. In this case the random mechanism was a bag of 10 coloured balls.  
 
There were thirteen different distributions of up to three colours, as shown in Table 
7 below, where each distribution constituted a different DT.  
Table 7: Design of the Allocation Task 
Decision 
Task 
Probability of the outcome = 
“Black 
ball” 
“White 
ball” 
“Yellow 
ball” 
DT1 0.9 0.1 0.0 
DT2 0.8 0.2 0.0 
DT3 0.8 0.1 0.1 
DT4 0.7 0.3 0.0 
DT5 0.7 0.2 0.1 
DT6 0.6 0.4 0.0 
DT7 0.6 0.3 0.1 
DT8 0.6 0.2 0.2 
DT9 0.5 0.5 0.0 
DT10 0.5 0.4 0.1 
DT11 0.5 0.3 0.2 
DT12 0.4 0.4 0.2 
DT13 0.4 0.3 0.3 
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Each task was implemented via a computer display such as the one shown in Figure 3 
below. In each case, participants indicated how much of the £20 they wished to 
allocate to each colour by moving the sliders, thereby setting the amounts at the 
right hand end of each slider to the nearest £0.10. It was explained that if one of 
these questions were selected to be the basis for the individual’s payment, the 
relevant mix of coloured balls would be put into an opaque bag. The respondent 
would then draw one ball at random from that bag and receive whatever sum of 
money she had allocated to that colour. 
 
Figure 3: Example of Display for an Allocation Procedure Decision Task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants moved from one DT to the next by scrolling down, and after making 
their thirteenth allocation they were invited to scroll back up to earlier answers and 
adjust them if they wished, in order to give them every opportunity to reflect upon 
their decision strategies and give the responses that they were content to have as 
the basis for payment. Once participants were satisfied with all their responses to 
the allocation DTs, they confirmed them as a whole. 
 
How might a standard deterministic model of state-contingent claims expect 
participants to behave? If respondents’ subjective values for the payoffs are 
functions only of the amounts on offer in the experiment, they will divide the £20, 
allocating X to Black, Y to White and Z to Yellow so that the marginal utilities of X, Y 
and Z are inversely proportional to the relative probabilities of success – i.e., in the 
example shown in Figure 3, so as to achieve u'(Z) = 3u'(Y) = 6u'(X).
13
 So those who are 
                                                 
13
 A standard formulation of EUT, where utility is a function of wealth, would suppose that an 
individual who comes to the experiment with existing wealth W would try to allocate the £20 between 
X, Y and Z so as to make the ratios of the marginal utilities of W+X, W+Y and W+Z equal to the 
inverse of the ratios of the probabilities of the different colours being drawn. However, much 
experimental evidence suggests that many respondents act as if they are not integrating payoffs with W 
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risk seeking, risk neutral or only slightly risk averse will set X = £20 and Y = Z = 0, 
producing an allocation with the highest available expected value (here, £12). Those 
who are extremely risk averse will set X = Y = £6.70 and Z = £6.60, giving an expected 
value of £6.69. Intermediate degrees of risk aversion result in allocations somewhere 
between the two, with lower EVs correlating with higher degrees of risk aversion. If 
we were to assume a particular functional form of EU such as CRRA, the 13 allocation 
decisions would allow us to estimate the risk attitude parameter which best 
organises a particular individual’s responses.
14
 
 
Recently, researchers have used different variants of the general idea of asking 
respondents to make allocation decisions. For example, Choi et al. (2007) asked their 
participants to distribute their budget across two states of nature whose 
probabilities of occurrence were fixed (either at ⅓ : ⅔ or at ½ : ½) but where the 
relative costs of state-contingent claims were varied. They concluded that many 
participants in the population could be divided into three main groups: (a) extremely 
risk averse types who always opt for a safe portfolio choice; (b) participants whose 
behaviour is consistent with risk neutrality and (c) participants who do not fall within 
(a) or (b) but whose decisions were approximately compatible with a simple 
proportionality heuristic. Not all participants fell cleanly into one or other category: 
some seemed to jump from one to another; others seemed to approximate one of 
the categories but with modifications. 
 
More recently, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) asked respondents to allocate tokens 
between different payoff dates, with earlier-paying tokens usually being worth less 
than later-dated tokens
15
 and with the sizes of those differences and the lengths of 
time between payoff dates being varied. A proportionality heuristic was not so easily 
available in this task and about 70% of allocations were corner solutions, either 
allocating all 100 tokens to the earlier date or else having all 100 tokens pay out at 
the later date, with 24 of the 97 respondents allocating all 100 tokens to the later 
date on every single occasion when later-dated tokens paid more, however small the 
difference and whatever the time delay involved.  
 
In a companion paper, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) compared cases where the 
time-dated payments were certain and cases where there was some probability less 
than 1 that they would be received: here certain payments seemed to be treated 
quite differently from risky payments, and although corner solutions still constituted 
more than a quarter of all observations in the risky scenarios, this was very different 
from the 80% of corner solutions in the certain scenarios in this experiment.  
 
These results are incompatible with standard deterministic-core-plus-white-noise 
models, but there is little discussion about the extent to which they might be 
artefacts of interactions between imprecise preferences and the allocation 
procedure. However, Cheung (2013) compared their allocation procedure with a 
choice list procedure: regarding the dichotomy between certain and uncertain 
                                                                                                                                            
but are focusing mainly or solely on gains or losses relative to their status quo level of wealth – see 
Rabin (2000). 
14
 See Appendix D for the calculations of CRRA coefficients. 
15
 Except for one of the 45 variants, where token values were the same while later-dated tokens 
involved a delay of 70 days. 
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payments, he states in his Abstract that “the effect disappears completely when a 
multiple price list instrument is used . . .”.   
 
Despite their possible susceptibility to rules of thumb as a way of coping with 
imprecise preferences, both Choi et al. and Andreoni and Sprenger make strong 
claims for the usefulness and greater plausibility of the estimates derived from their 
allocation tasks. In a recent paper, Charness and Gneezy (2012) have also advocated 
the use of an allocation procedure for measuring risk attitudes. Additional support 
for this kind of procedure comes from Hey and Pace (2011, p. 2) who assert that such 
tasks “are more informative than pairwise choice questions and probably more 
reliable than reservation price questions and thus more able to detect true 
preferences”. However, with the exception of Cheung (2013), we are not aware of 
any  systematic comparison that has been conducted between this procedure and 
other methods of eliciting risk attitudes, so an investigation of the properties of such 
a task should be of interest. 
 
4.2 Results for the Allocation Procedure
16
 
To give some initial picture of the way people responded to the allocation task, Table 
8 shows the distributions of amounts allocated to Black for DT1, DT2, DT4 and DT6, 
the four simplest cases where there were only Black and White balls and where 
Prob(Black) > 0.5. The amounts allocated to Black are shown by the row labels and 
the columns show the numbers of individuals falling into each row for the four 
different DTs. Since respondents had strong inclinations to give answers rounded to 
the nearest whole pound, every other row shows whole-pound responses, while the 
rows in between capture responses involving other multiples of £0.10.
17
 
 
Going to the bottom row, we see that in DT1, 156 individuals allocated all £20 to 
Black. Reading along that bottom row shows that the numbers allocating all £20 to 
Black falls markedly as the probability of Black falls, leaving just 16 in this category 
for DT6. Of these, 6 displayed at least some degree of risk aversion in other DTs, 
leaving just 10 who allocated all £20 to the highest probability events in every DT. 
Thus at most there are 10 out of 351 participants who display behaviour consistent 
with risk neutrality or risk seeking as judged on the basis of this procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 For the allocation procedure, there was no difference between V1 and V2 – all participants saw 
exactly the same decision tasks in the same order until they reached DT15, as described in the previous 
Section. 
17
 From £10 to £20 inclusive, there are 101 multiples of £0.10, of which just 11 are whole pounds; yet 
in Table 8, whole pounds account for 89% of responses. The slider mechanism did not make it easier to 
give whole pound responses than any other (apart, perhaps from the £20 endpoint), so this pattern 
strongly suggests a high degree of deliberate rounding in most people’s responses – arguably a further 
reflection of the imprecision of people’s preferences. 
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Table 8: Allocation to Black in DT1, DT2, DT4 and DT6 
£ in 
Black 
DT1 
0.9 : 0.1 
DT2 
0.8 : 0.2 
DT4 
0.7 : 0.3 
DT6 
0.6 : 0.4 
10 6 6 14 71 
 - 1 4 11 
11 - - - 30 
 1 - 3 6 
12 1 - 29 154 
 - 1 8 20 
13 1 5 21 7 
 - 2 7 5 
14 - 3 111 6 
 - 1 10 - 
15 26 57 71 16 
 2 13 13 4 
16 6 104 10 4 
 1 7 2 - 
17 18 18 10 1 
 10 8 1 - 
18 96 31 3 - 
 7 1 1 - 
19 16 8 - - 
 4 3 - - 
20 156 82 33 16 
 
 
For DT2, DT4 and DT6, the modal response involves dividing the £20 in exact 
proportion to the probabilities, while for DT1 this is the second most popular 
response. In fact, 55 (15.7%) of the 351 respondents divided the £20 in exact 
proportion to the probabilities in every one of the 13 allocation tasks; and 37.4% of 
all responses exhibited such proportionality
18
. One interpretation is that a 
substantial minority of respondents’ utility functions are logarithmic (or 
approximately so) in gains. A rather different interpretation is that many 
respondents who have somewhat imprecise preferences are content to adopt a 
simple proportionality heuristic which has broadly appealing properties – it involves 
putting more money on higher-probability events while not staking everything on 
just one – and which just happens to operate in the same way as logarithmic utility. 
If the first interpretation is correct, we should expect these individuals to exhibit 
behaviour consistent with a logarithmic utility function in the ranking and choice list 
tasks; if the second interpretation is closer to the mark, logarithmic utility will fail to 
predict behaviour in those other tasks where the same heuristic is not so readily 
available. We shall return to this issue in Section 5. 
 
Those individuals exhibiting proportionality are a substantial minority, but a minority 
nevertheless. In order to form some view about the extent to which the allocation 
task provides a measure of relative risk attitude across the sample as a whole while 
                                                 
18
 This last figure excludes DT9, where there were 5 Black and 5 White balls and where 322 divided 
the £20 equally: including these takes the overall average to 41.6%. 
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avoiding any specific functional form, we rank individuals within each DT according 
to the EVs of their chosen allocation. That is, we suppose that if individual G is more 
risk averse than individual H, G will prefer an allocation in each task which entails a 
smaller spread of payoffs and a lower EV than the allocation selected by H.  
 
Table 9 shows the Spearman rank correlation between every pair of DTs (except DT9 
where all EVs were necessarily the same). Although all of these correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, there is considerable 
variability, from 0.843 down to 0.187. As we found with the choice list tasks, the 
correlations tend to be highest between those tasks that are adjacent and/or with 
the most similar parameters, and tend to fall for pairs that are further apart and/or 
more different. If we can only make rather limited inferences from one allocation 
task to another, how much more cautious should we be about inferences to other 
kinds of decision task? That is the question addressed in the next Section. 
 
Table 9: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, Allocation Procedure 
 
 
5. Comparisons Between Procedures 
 
5.1 Previous Comparisons Within and Between Procedures 
Several studies have compared elicited risk attitudes across procedures, with mixed 
results. Dave et al. (2010) compare H&L and E&G procedures and correlate obtained 
results with the measure of numerical skills. They conclude that EUT with CRRA fits 
the data from both tasks equally well in the subsample of participants with relatively 
low numerical skills, but for those with high numerical skills, EUT with CRRA fits the 
data better in the H&L task than in the E&G task. Harrison and Rutstrom (2008, p.82) 
compare both methods with a third based on separate binary choices and derive 
CRRA estimates from all three. They note that the H&L procedure exhibits a 
statistically significant order effect but they “tentatively conclude . . . that the 
procedures should be expected to generate roughly the same estimates of risk 
attitudes for a target population . . . when used at the beginning of a session”. 
 
By contrast, Deck et al. (2008) compare coefficients of CRRA across three tasks: H&L, 
E&G and a task which represents a series of binary choices between a risky lottery 
and an amount of money for certain. They observe significant differences in the 
 DT2 DT3 DT4 DT5 DT6 DT7 DT8 DT10 DT11 DT12 DT13 
DT1 0.744 0.733 0.513 0.621 0.187 0.513 0.324 0.640 0.397 0.414 0.232 
DT2  0.843 0.672 0.713 0.365 0.618 0.479 0.582 0.459 0.500 0.300 
DT3   0.634 0.725 0.354 0.638 0.510 0.599 0.454 0.434 0.286 
DT4    0.817 0.463 0.588 0.512 0.480 0.436 0.427 0.326 
DT5     0.457 0.728 0.573 0.619 0.501 0.551 0.359 
DT6      0.588 0.662 0.266 0.353 0.321 0.258 
DT7       0.730 0.645 0.571 0.533 0.360 
DT8        0.391 0.537 0.491 0.367 
DT10         0.553 0.532 0.278 
DT11          0.606 0.371 
DT12           0.417 
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obtained coefficients between tasks and account for these inconsistencies using 
participants’ personality traits. Our study extends the range of comparisons for the 
E&G and H&L procedures and allows further comparisons with the allocation 
procedure.  
 
5.2 Choice List and Ranking Procedures 
Up to this point we have tried to avoid using any particular functional forms because 
any such usage is open to the objection that the selected form may be the wrong 
one – at least, for some, and perhaps many, members of a sample. On the other 
hand, the instruments discussed in previous sections often are used in conjunction 
with particular specifications.
19
 So it may be of interest to consider an example in 
relation to the H&L and E&G tasks. Were we to assume CRRA, using a standard 
format whereby u(x) = x
1-r
/(1-r) for r ≠ 1 and u(x) = ln(x) for r = 1, we could use the 
median
20
 estimate of r derived from people’s responses to the five choice list tasks 
to predict their top-ranked options in the DT14 ranking task, and then compare 
those predictions with the actual responses.  
 
Table 10 does that. For both subsamples, there are very clear differences between 
the actual distributions and those based on the choice list procedure. Most strikingly, 
the choice list tasks never produce a median r high enough to entail ranking the sure 
£10 option first and only seldom produce a median r greater than 1, whereas the 
majority of individuals behave in the ranking task as if their values of r are greater 
than 1. 
Table 10: Actual vs Inferred Top Ranked Options in DT14 
 
So although there may be a significantly positive rank correlation between the two 
procedures – for example, the Spearman correlation coefficients for DT14 and DT20 
are 0.392 for V1 and 0.463 for V2, both of which are significant at the 1% level – the 
degree of transferability of more precise parameter estimates may be very much 
more limited. Of course, we acknowledge that part of the reason for this could be 
                                                 
19
 For those readers interested in further analysis on the basis of the most common assumption – that 
people can be reasonably well modelled as CRRA EU maximisers – we have included a number of 
such analyses in Appendix D. 
20
 We take the median because it is less susceptible to extreme (and sometimes simply confused or 
mistaken) responses, especially when we have only five observations. 
 
V1 
Actual 
DT14 
V1 
Inferred 
DT14 
 
V2 
Actual 
DT14 
V2 
Inferred 
DT14 
A: £10 for sure 70 0  77 0 
B: £15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 28 5  22 9 
C: £20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 23 25  26 26 
D: £25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 13 62  5 54 
E: £30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 2 39  4 35 
F: £35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 36 40  45 55 
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that CRRA is not the appropriate specification for all individuals; but that only serves 
to underline the fact that the validity of any parameter estimates depends upon the 
adequacy of the particular assumption made about a functional form. 
 
5.3 The Allocation and Choice List Procedures 
In Section 4 we saw that dividing the £20 total in strict proportion to observed 
probabilities was a popular response, with 55 participants doing so in every one of 
the thirteen DTs. Even for those who sometimes divided the total in some other way, 
proportionality was often observed, and overall 150 participants’ median response 
was strictly proportional.  
 
If that median were reasonably diagnostic, we should expect these 150 to behave 
quite similarly to one another in the choice list decision tasks – that is, to be 
switching at much the same point as each other in each list. But that is not what we 
see: although they may be a little more tightly clustered than the rest of the sample 
in DT17 and DT19, the difference is slight. For the other three choice lists, there is no 
discernible difference: they are typically distributed across four or five switching 
points in much the same way as those for whom proportional allocation was not the 
median. The allocation procedure is at best a weak indicator of behaviour in the 
choice list tasks. 
 
5.4 The Allocation and Ranking Procedures 
In this case, we can make direct comparisons between two tasks – DT4 and V2’s 
DT15 – which effectively asked the same question framed differently. In DT4, 
respondents were asked to divide £20 between Black and White when there were 7 
Black and 3 White balls. In the DT15 presented to V2, there were 7 Black and 3 White 
balls and six discrete options offering different ways of dividing £20 between Black 
and White. In short, this version of DT15 is essentially the same as DT4 except that 
the options are restricted to the six involving payoffs which are multiples of £2. 
 
If we were to assume that, when presented with DT15, each respondent would 
select the option closest to whatever answer she gave in DT4 (with those giving 
responses exactly halfway between options being assigned in equal numbers to 
both), we can again compare the distribution of actual responses to DT15 with the 
distribution inferred from DT4, as in Table 11 below. 
 
It is clear that the actual pattern of responses was very different from the one that 
would be inferred from the allocation task, with the ranking task pulling towards the 
less risk averse options E and F while the allocation task pulled the distribution 
strongly towards the proportional division. Thus nearly three times as many 
participants top-ranked E and F as would have been predicted from the allocation 
responses, while about 50% more participants were predicted to top-rank the 
£14:£6 option C than actually did so – and this, even after they had previously 
undertaken 13 allocation tasks that might have primed them towards 
proportionality. Such a difference would be compatible with the general proposition 
that people are imprecise about their preferences and thus are liable to process 
what is formally the same problem in rather different ways when the framing 
provides rather different procedural ‘cues’. It is plainly incompatible with any 
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‘deterministic-core-plus-white-noise’ model that would entail only random 
differences between the two distributions. 
 
Table 11: Actual vs Inferred Top Ranked Options in DT15, V2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A similar story – indeed, arguably an even more striking story – comes from 
examining the behaviour of the 55 individuals who divided the £20 in all thirteen 
allocation tasks exactly in proportion to the probabilities. Such unerring consistency 
might seem to be a strong expression of precise preferences, in which case this 
subset of respondents might be expected to display high levels of consistency in the 
next DT they encountered – the ranking task DT14, which was common to both V1 
and V2. If we took those individuals’ preferences to be logarithmic in gains, there 
would be a precise prediction for DT14: the optimal option, were it to be available, 
would be (£17.50, 0.5; £7, 0.5).  
 
In fact, the two closest options that were actually available on either side of that 
‘optimum’ were (£15, 0.5; £8, 0.5). and (£20, 0.5; £6, 0.5). However, only 12 (21.8%) 
of the 55 individuals put one or other of those options first, while 39 (70.9%) of them 
chose one of the extreme options – either £10 for sure or (£35, 0.5; £0, 0.5). It might 
be that, far from the allocation task tapping into preferences with much greater 
precision, those who stuck most rigidly to a proportionality heuristic were if anything 
less confident about their preferences and were therefore more content to use a 
simple rule of thumb. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
It would be convenient if it were true that most people have an ‘attitude to risk’ 
which is expressed in a stable and consistent manner across multiple contexts and 
which is reasonably easy to measure by some simple task. If this were true, it would 
be highly desirable to include a couple of such tasks in experiments or surveys in 
order to be able to take account of risk attitude when analysing data and 
interpreting their significance. 
 
However, our results caution against supposing that the three procedures used in a 
number of recent studies can deliver the desired level of reliability and 
transferability. In arriving at our conclusions, we have for the most part tried to avoid 
 Actual 
DT15 
Inferred 
from DT4 
 
A:£10 for sure 19 13  (13 + 0) 
B:£12, 0.7; £8, 0.3 15 22.5  (19 + 0 + 3.5) 
C:£14, 0.7; £6, 0.3 67 92.5  (71 + 3.5 + 18) 
D:£16, 0.7; £4, 0.3 22 30.5  (11 + 18 + 1.5) 
E:£18, 0.7; £2, 0.3 16 3.5  (2 + 1.5 + 0) 
F:£20, 0.7; £0, 0.3 40 17  (17 + 0) 
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assuming any particular functional forms but have relied instead on nonparametric 
measures that provide much more general tests. The picture emerging from our 
experiment may be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Except in cases where individuals follow an available rule of thumb, most 
individuals’ responses to different questions within a particular procedure 
exhibit a degree of variability which appears to increase as the structure 
and/or parameters of the questions become more dissimilar. Thus it may 
be unsafe to expect that just one or two questions of any kind can provide 
a reliable measure at the individual level. Moreover, the way in which 
variability between responses changes as questions become more 
dissimilar leads us to conjecture that even if one were arguing for a 
‘deterministic-core-plus-white-noise’ model within a procedure, an off-
the-shelf standard error specification is unlikely to be adequate: at the 
very least, we should investigate the extent to which the noise is 
contextual and/or heteroscedastic (see Buschena and Zilberman, 2000, 
and Wilcox, 2011). 
2. However, this will not suffice. Even when we hold constant the 
parameters and the type of task, significant differences in patterns of 
response can still be induced by something as seemingly innocuous as 
which way up a table is presented. This is consistent with decision making 
having a potentially influential procedural component. 
 
3. The fact that some individuals display high degrees of consistency in a 
particular type of task does not necessarily mean either that they have 
highly articulated underlying preferences or that the task is particularly 
good at detecting preferences which will transfer to other contexts. In 
fact, the opposite might be the case: it may be that a number of people 
who are quite uncertain about their preferences may find it appealing to 
use a simple heuristic that ‘solves’ the problem for them. However, this 
may have little or no predictive power in other tasks where that heuristic 
is not so readily available. 
 
The overall picture, then, is that most individuals exhibit a good deal of variability in 
their responses to questions intended to elicit their risk attitudes. There is some rank 
correlation between risk attitudes elicited by different questions, but the imprecision 
of most people’s preferences may make them susceptible to considerable procedural 
effects.  
 
How should we react to these findings? In the short run, one recommendation is that 
researchers who wish to take some account of and/or make some adjustment for 
risk attitude in their studies should take care to pick an elicitation procedure as 
similar as possible to the type of decision they are studying; and ideally, should use 
several different questions and/or at least two different procedures in order to check 
the sensitivity of the risk attitude parameter estimates they generate.  
 
In the longer run, the challenge is to engage with the inherently stochastic nature of 
human decision making and develop models of the processes which produce 
people’s responses. Deterministic models may be analytically more tractable, but 
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they are not realistic; and adding some more or less arbitrary random error term to a 
deterministic core will not make them so. If the variability in human judgment is a 
reflection of decision making as a cognitive process, we need to try to gain a better 
understanding of how contextual or procedural factors interact with that process. 
Wishing such influences away and assuming that decision processes are reducible to 
one-size-fits-all sets of axioms has not and will not produce a descriptively adequate 
account of human behaviour under risk and uncertainty. 
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Supplementary Material  
 
Appendix A: Experimental Procedure and Instructions 
 
The experiment was computerised using Qualtrics Software. We invited 800 
undergraduate students at the University of Warwick via the electronic volunteers’ 
register of the Decision Research at Warwick (DR@W) group.  Students were invited 
to participate in the experiment online at any time during a five-day period (from 
22.11.2010 to 26.11.2010) on the understanding that 50 of those who participated 
would be picked at random to come to the laboratory at a mutually convenient time 
and enact one of their decisions – also randomly selected – and be paid according to 
how that decision played out.
21
 We took various precautions to ensure that no 
individual participated more than once.
22
  
Of the 800 invited to take part, 400 randomly selected people were sent a link to the 
‘treatment’ variation 1 (V1) of the experiment and the other 400 received a link to 
the variation 2 (V2). Both variations of the experiment were designed using the 
Qualtrics software. Experimental tasks were accessible via the following links on the 
Qualtrics website
23
: 
• V1: https://columbia.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9GH9H9WSptIYgJK 
• V2: https://columbia.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_1Mte22jrFxXKYJu 
People were asked to follow the link and read the experimental instructions. On the 
first screen of the experiment, potential participants were told that the experiment 
consisted of 20 questions. They were also informed that all participants who 
complete the experiment by the specified deadline would enter a random draw. 50 
participants, selected in this random draw, would then be invited to the 
experimental laboratory and would have an opportunity to play out their decisions 
(made online) for real money.  
By the end of the five-day period, 423 completed sets of decisions had been 
submitted: 206 for V1 and 217 for V2. We recorded the time participants took to 
complete the experiment (this was the time between starting to answer the first task 
and submitting the last decision in the experiment). The median completion time 
was 19 minutes across the two versions (median completion times for both versions 
were very similar: 18 minutes for V1 and 19 minutes for V2). 319 participants (75%) 
took less than 30 minutes to complete the experiment. Even though participants had 
an opportunity to complete the experiment over the course of 5 days (dropping and 
picking up experimental tasks at any point), only 7 people (2%) took more than 1 day 
to complete all the tasks. 
To ensure transparency, the ID numbers of the 50 people picked at random to be 
paid were reported to all 423 participants (the participants received information 
about the total number of replies received by the experimental team and, therefore, 
                                                 
21
 Several recent papers on choice under risk and uncertainty show that incentive mechanisms where 
each participant is paid according to her decisions and where several participants are selected at 
random and paid for their decisions produce very similar results (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Trautmann et 
al., 2011).  
22
 Each participant had previously signed up on the DR@W register of volunteers and was personally 
invited to the experiment and received a unique sign-in ID. Only one reply from each ID was allowed. 
23
 Both versions of the experiment are currently accessible via the links specified above. 
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had complete knowledge of the odds to be selected). An additional e-mail was sent 
to the randomly selected participants explaining when and how they can play out 
their decisions and receive their payoffs.  These participants were given one working 
week (following the experiment) to come to the experimental laboratory and play 
out their decisions made online. 41 out of 50 randomly selected participants tuned 
up during the allocated week, 8 made special arrangements and were paid after they 
came back to the University from their Christmas holidays. One person who was 
randomly selected has never turned up and never made contact with the 
experimental team despite receiving multiple reminders. The average payoff in the 
experiment was £10.90.
24
 
The screenshot of the first screen is displayed below. 
 
 
 
 
After reading the general instructions, participants received specific instructions to 
the allocation procedure which consisted of 13 decision tasks. There instructions are 
displayed in the next page. 
                                                 
24
 Further details about the experimental procedure are given in Appendix A. 
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These specific instructions were followed by 13 decision tasks (DT1-DT13) displayed 
on the same screen. These decision tasks were the same in both versions of the 
experiment (V1 and V2). Participants could scroll up and down using the computer 
mouse to make choices as well as to change their previous choices before they 
proceeded to the ranking procedure. In the ranking procedure, participants received 
specific instructions (displayed below) followed by two decision tasks (DT14 and 
DT15). DT14 was the same for both versions of the experiment and DT15 differed 
between the two versions.  
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Finally, after completing the ranking procedure, participants proceeded to the choice 
list procedure. At that point, they saw specific instructions followed by the last 5 
decision tasks (DT16-DT20). These specific instructions are displayed below: 
 
 
 
 
Each of the 50 participants selected to play out one of their decisions was offered an 
individual 5-minute appointment. When they came, they selected one decision task 
at random and were paid according to their decision in that task. If in a particular 
decision task, a lottery was selected, a participant would receive an outcome of that 
lottery. If a sure amount was selected, a participant would receive that sure amount. 
Payments were made in cash at the end of each individual appointment. 
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Appendix B: Exclusion Criteria 
 
In Appendix B we discuss how far responses in our 3 elicitation procedures conform 
with principles typically assumed in the analysis of decision making (such as respect 
for dominance). We identify grounds for setting aside some of our 423 participants’ 
responses from the main analysis.  
As noted in Section 1 of the manuscript, most people’s responses to many 
experimental decision tasks exhibit some stochastic component. Some variability of 
this kind appears to be intrinsic to brain function and it would therefore be too 
restrictive to exclude participants on the grounds that they exhibit any inconsistency 
at all. On the other hand, most people who have run experiments will acknowledge 
that there are often a (hopefully small) minority of participants who fail to 
understand the tasks and/or who adopt rather eccentric response strategies. It may 
not always be straightforward to draw a sharp line between random error and 
deeper misconceptions, but in order to reduce the risk that overall patterns are 
driven too much by confused outliers, we sought to try to set to one side any 
participants who appeared to exhibit more systematic signs of confusion (although in 
Appendix C we repeat the main forms of analysis for the full sample, in order to 
show how far our exclusion policy changes any conclusions we draw). 
 
(a)  The Allocation Procedure 
In each of DT1, DT2, DT4 and DT6 there were only two colours, Black and White, with 
more Black balls than White balls. We should therefore expect respect for stochastic 
dominance to require that at least as much money is allocated to Black as to White 
in each case. The use of the slider might have meant that someone in haste could 
have allocated a little more to White than to Black even when they intended to 
allocate equal sums to both (reflecting extreme risk aversion); but if the amount 
allocated to White was 50p or more greater than the amount allocated to Black
25
, 
we counted this as an inconsistency.  
 
In fact, there were very few such inconsistencies. One individual adopted an ‘inverse 
matching’ strategy, dividing the money in inverse proportion to the probabilities – 
i.e., dividing the £20 2:18 in DT1, 4:16 in DT2, 6:14 in DT4 and 8:12 in DT6. There 
were no other inconsistencies among the other 422 participants in DT2 or DT4, one 
other in DT1 and two others in DT6. In these most basic allocation tasks, then, more 
than 99% of responses satisfied a minimal consistency condition. 
 
In DT3, DT8 and DT13, the numbers of White and Yellow balls were the same. We 
should therefore expect the amounts allocated to be the same (except for small 
differences that might be attributed to hasty use of the slider). In DT12, there were 
four Black, four White and two Yellow balls, so that we should expect the amounts 
allocated to Black and White to be the same (except for small ‘slider errors’ and in 
cases where an individual behaves as if risk neutral, allocating zero to Yellow and 
obtaining equal expected value with any division between Black and White). 
                                                 
25
 It could be argued that 50p is an arbitrary cut-off, and to some extent it is, but the dataset suggests it 
is the smallest ‘round’ amount that people in this task used to signify an intentional difference. 
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The numbers of cases where the ‘equality’ requirement was breached by a 
difference of 50p or more varied across these four questions: for DT3 it was 
breached by 11 participants; for DT8, by 25; for DT12 by 21; and for DT13, by 39. The 
stronger form of inconsistency, where an individual allocated at least 50p more to a 
colour with a strictly lower probability of occurring, was very much less common: 
apart from the individual who followed the ‘inverse proportion’ strategy rigorously 
throughout, there was just one instance for DT3, two for DT8, two for DT12 and 
eight for DT13. 
 
In DT5, DT7, DT10 and DT11, Black was always strictly more probable than White, 
which in turn was always strictly more probable than Yellow. So inconsistencies in 
these questions involved allocating at least 50p more to Yellow than to White or 
Black and/or allocating at least 50p more to White than to Black. Apart from the 
individual using the ‘inverse proportion’ strategy throughout, there were, 
respectively, three, two, four and five such inconsistencies. 
 
So it appears that when one probability is strictly greater than another, there are few 
violations of dominance, suggesting that the great majority of participants paid 
attention to the stimuli and satisfied a basic requirement of rationality. When two 
colours were equiprobable, some participants found it less compelling that they 
should allocate the same amount to each, although the clear majority did go for an 
equal allocation (‘slider error’ aside). If a single breach of the ‘equality’ requirement 
was the only form of inconsistency, we did not exclude the participant’s data from 
the analysis. In the allocation procedure, therefore, we excluded from the analysis 
the 12 participants who violated dominance by 50p or more and a further 19 who 
breached the equality requirement by more than 50p on at least two occasions. 
 
(b) The Ranking Procedure 
Although it is usually assumed that preferences are single-peaked, this is an 
assumption that does not appear to have been much examined. A comprehensive 
review of all possible rankings and their compatibility with single-peakedness would 
require a long and complex discussion, but some basic analysis may be informative. 
An individual whose preferences are single-peaked could be expected to identify his 
second-ranked option as being adjacent to his top-ranked option; and his third-
ranked option would then be expected either to be adjacent to the second-ranked 
option or else adjacent to the first-ranked option on the other side. Confining our 
present analysis to just the first three ranked items, Table B1 reports the results for 
DT14 (which was presented to the whole sample) and DT15 (which was different for 
the two versions V1 and V2). 
 
The row labelled ‘First three consistent’ shows how many participants gave rankings 
1, 2 and 3 in a pattern consistent with single-peakedness as described above. The 
row labelled ‘First two only adjacent’ reports the numbers of participants whose 
second-ranked option was adjacent to the first-ranked option but whose third-
ranked option was not adjacent to either of the first two. The row labelled ‘First and 
second not adjacent’ records how many participants did not fulfil this most basic 
requirement of single-peakedness.   
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On average, the first three rankings were consistent with single-peakedness in just 
over 70% of responses, while 12.3% of the total did not satisfy adjacency for the two 
highest ranked options. Of this latter group, the most prevalent ‘deviation’ involved 
the first two rankings being at opposite ends of the table: out of the total of 104 
observations in the bottom row of Table B1, 68 exhibited this pattern. 
 
 
Table B1: Consistency with Single-peakedness 
 DT14 DT15 
V1 V2 V1 V2 
First three consistent 
131 
(63.6%) 
144 
(66.4%) 
167 
(81.1%) 
154 
(71.0%) 
First two only adjacent 
42 
(20.4%) 
51 
(23.5%) 
17 
(8.3%) 
36 
(16.6%) 
First and second not 
adjacent 
33 
(16.0%) 
22 
(10.1%) 
22 
(10.7%) 
27 
(12.4%) 
 
 
A single case where the first and second ranked options are not adjacent might be 
attributable to error, but if we observe such non-adjacency in both of an individual’s 
responses to these questions, we omit that individual from the main analysis: 25 
participants came into this category, of whom two were already excluded on the 
basis of their allocation procedure responses, bringing the total of exclusions on the 
basis of the allocation and ranking procedures up to 54. 
 
(c) The Choice List Procedure 
The design of this procedure implies that participants with standard preferences 
should make at most one switch from the left hand side of a particular table to the 
right hand side, or vice-versa. For each task of this type (DT16-DT20) we can identify 
cases when a participant switched more than once. If this pattern could be regarded 
as the result of a single misjudged choice – that is, if by changing just one choice in 
one row, we could produce a single switching point – we classify this as a ‘weak’ 
inconsistency. On the other hand, if we observe multiple switching and/or a pattern 
of choice which violates dominance in a way that cannot be resolved by a single 
change, we classify this as a ‘strong’ inconsistency.  
Across the five choice list tasks, 379 participants exhibited no inconsistencies at all, 
and a further 28 exhibited just one weak inconsistency, which might be attributed to 
a momentary lapse of attention. 26 other participants exhibited at least one strong 
inconsistency and/or more than one weak inconsistency, and we have excluded 
them from the analysis. Allowing for the fact that some of these were also excluded 
according to criteria from the allocation procedure and/or the ranking procedure, 
this brings the total number of exclusions to 72, leaving 351 (172 in V1 and 179 in 
V2) who form the basis of the analysis presented in the paper. 
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Appendix C: Results for All Participants 
 
In Appendix B we explained that 72 participants were excluded from consideration in 
our analysis due to various reasons (e.g., violation of dominance). In Appendix C we 
conduct a robustness check and show that results which are reported in the main 
body of the paper do not change if we include all 423 participants’ decisions into our 
dataset. 
 
Table C1 replicates Table 1 for the entire sample. 
 
Table C1: Distributions of Responses in DT16–DT20 
Sure/Safer 
DT16 
(£10, 0.6; 0, 0.4) 
vs £10 to £1 
DT17 
(£18, p; £3, 1-p) 
vs £8 
DT18 
(£18, 0.2; £3, 0.8) 
vs £10 to £1 
DT19 
(£15, p; 0, 1-p)  
vs £5 
DT20 
(£8, p; £5, 1-p)  
vs (£20, p; £1, 1-p) 
V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 
0   1 3 1 1 1 1 1 - 2 1 
1  3 1 1 1 - 1 - 2 3 1 
2  2 2 6 8 4 11 6 6 26 26 
3  19 5 45 63 8 23 46 47 50 26 
4  49 42 69 70 39 53 62 73 56 52 
5  58 66 44 45 71 70 38 44 35 58 
6  50 65 28 20 49 31 42 20 25 34 
7  17 26 9 7 28 23 8 15 8 14 
8  3 4 1 2 1 3 1 7 - 3 
9 - 2 2 - 1 - 2 3 1 2 
10 4 1 - - 4 1 - - - - 
Average 
Sure/Safer 
choices 
5.01 5.30 4.37 4.13 5.29 4.78 4.48 4.49 3.98 4.48 
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Tables C2 and C3 show the rank correlation coefficients for each pair of tasks within 
each subsample. 
 
Table C2: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, Choice List Procedure, V1 
 
 
 
 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001 level 
 
Table C3: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, Choice List Procedure, V2 
 
 
 
 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0. 001 level 
 
In all cases, the correlations are positive and statistically significant, and in both 
subsamples they are highest for the two most similar tasks, DT17 and DT19. This 
confirms our results reported for the fraction of the participants in the main body of 
the paper that there is at least some degree of heterogeneity between individuals, 
with some tending to be more or less risk averse than others, but for comparisons 
other than DT17-DT19 the coefficients are low, which is compatible with a good deal 
of imprecision and susceptibility to procedural effects.  
  
 DT17 DT18 DT19 DT20 
DT16 0.150* 0.224
**
 0.331
***
 0.404
***
 
DT17  0.276
***
 0.626
***
 0.400
***
 
DT18   0.286
***
 0.247
**
 
DT19    0.538
***
 
 DT17 DT18 DT19 DT20 
DT16 0.241
**
 0.172
*
 0.293
***
 0.415
***
 
DT17  0.225
**
 0.532
***
 0.393
***
 
DT18   0.183
**
 0.155
*
 
DT19    0.475
***
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Table 4 in the main paper was a table of parameters. Tables C5 and C6 replicate 
Tables 5 and 6 and provide a summary of the comparison between DT14 and DT15 in 
the ranking procedure. 
 
Table C5: 1
st
 Choices in DT14 and DT15, V1 subsample 
DT14 1
st
 Choice DT15 1
st 
Choice 
A: £10 for sure 86 134 A: £10 for sure 
B: £15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 37 29 B: £15, 0.3; £8, 0.7 
C: £20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 25 14 C: £20, 0.3; £6, 0.7 
D: £25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 14 4 D: £25, 0.3; £4, 0.7 
E: £30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 2 3 E: £30, 0.3; £2, 0.7 
F: £35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 42 22 F: £35, 0.3; £0, 0.7 
 
Table C6: 1
st
 Choices in DT14 and DT15, V2 subsample 
DT14 1
st 
Choice DT15 1
st
 Choice 
A: £10 for sure 92 27 A: £10 for sure 
B: £15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 29 17 B: £12, 0.7; £8, 0.3 
C: £20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 31 74 C: £14, 0.7; £6, 0.3 
D: £25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 6 29 D: £16, 0.7; £4, 0.3 
E: £30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 5 16 E: £18, 0.7; £2, 0.3 
F: £35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 54 54 F: £20, 0.7; £0, 0.3 
 
 
Results presented in Tables C5 and C6 are remarkably similar to the results 
summarized in Tables 5 and 6 in the main body of the paper. In Table C5, the 
direction of movement is as expected, although of the 86 who chose the sure option 
in DT14, 17 moved away to a riskier position in DT15, despite those options offering 
much poorer gains in return for the extra risk. At the same time, the 92 who opted 
for A in DT14 (and therefore turned down the mean-variance trade-off in B or 
beyond) should not on that basis have opted for anything riskier than B in DT15 (see 
Table C6). However, only 29 participants select lotteries according to this prediction 
in DT15, while the other 63 opt for much riskier alternatives. 
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Table 7 in the main paper showed the parameters for the allocation tasks. Table C8 
below categorises responses to the tasks that involved only Black and White balls in 
ratios greater than 1. 
 
Table C8: Allocation to Black in DT1, DT2, DT4 and DT6 
£ in 
Black 
DT1 
0.9 : 0.1 
DT2 
0.8 : 0.2 
DT4 
0.7 : 0.3 
DT6 
0.6 : 0.4 
<10 2 1 1 3 
10 6 7 17 88 
 - 1 5 17 
11 - - 1 33 
 1 1 3 8 
12 1 2 34 173 
 - 3 14 23 
13 2 5 27 14 
 1 2 10 7 
14 - 4 128 8 
 2 2 13 - 
15 33 70 83 22 
 4 16 13 4 
16 7 117 13 4 
 1 9 2 - 
17 19 20 11 1 
 13 12 3 - 
18 106 36 6 - 
 8 4 1 - 
19 23 10 - - 
 7 4 - - 
20 187 97 38 18 
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Table C9 provides a summary of the Spearman rank correlations in the allocation 
task for all 423 participants. 
 
Table C9: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients,  
Allocation Procedure for (all) 423 Participants 
 
 
All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. However, there 
is considerable variability in the coefficients, from 0.815 down to 0.175. The 
correlations tend to be highest between those tasks that are adjacent and/or have 
the most similar parameters, and tend to fall for pairs that are further apart and/or 
more different. Generally, the correlation coefficients reported in Table C9 are lower 
than those in Table 9 in the main paper. But overall, the behavioural patterns 
reported in the paper for 351 participants are very similar to those for all 423 
participants. 
 
  
 DT2 DT3 DT4 DT5 DT6 DT7 DT8 DT10 DT11 DT12 DT13 
DT1 0.707 0.705 0.511 0.606 0.213 0.513 0.338 0.622 0.381 0.421 0.175 
DT2  0.815 0.687 0.694 0.374 0.595 0.484 0.553 0.446 0.509 0.263 
DT3   0.634 0.733 0.377 0.633 0.525 0.570 0.460 0.430 0.245 
DT4    0.789 0.478 0.575 0.535 0.464 0.445 0.463 0.317 
DT5     0.474 0.719 0.581 0.591 0.495 0.538 0.325 
DT6      0.619 0.682 0.277 0.390 0.366 0.303 
DT7       0.730 0.628 0.546 0.529 0.348 
DT8        0.390 0.554 0.499 0.389 
DT10         0.542 0.530 0.272 
DT11          0.597 0.368 
DT12           0.387 
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Appendix D: Estimations of CRRA Coefficients 
 
(a) Within-procedural comparison 
In the main paper, most of our analysis tried to avoid using any specific form of 
utility function. Yet, our analysis can also be done with a functional form in mind. For 
example, our results can be replicated if we assume the CRRA utility function where 
u(x) = x
1-r
/(1-r) for r ≠ 1 and u(x) = ln(x) for r = 1. 
 
Table D1 shows the variability across the different decision tasks presented in the 
Allocation Procedure in terms of the percentages behaving as if r > 1, or as if r = 1, or 
as if r < 1: the degree of variability is clearly at odds with the idea that each 
individual has some ‘true’ risk coefficient r*, with each person’s revealed r on any 
occasion deviating from their r* only randomly.
26
 Therefore, values of the coefficient 
r vary significantly within the Allocation Procedure. 
 
 
Table D1 Percentages in Different r Categories, by Question 
CRRA 
coefficient 
r 
DT1 DT2 DT3 DT4 DT5 DT6 DT7 DT8 
DT1
0 
DT1
1 
DT1
2 
DT1
3 
9:1 8:2 8:1:1 7:3 7:2:1 6:4 6:3:1 6:2:2 5:4:1 5:3:2 4:4:2 4:3:3 
r < 1 52.1 45.0 43.6 43.9 39.9 22.5 28.8 25.1 21.9 29.6 35.9 30.5 
r = 1 27.4 29.6 28.8 31.6 25.6 43.9 31.3 43.3 32.8 43.3 53.8 57.5 
r > 1 20.5 26.4 27.6 24.5 34.5 33.6 39.9 31.6 45.3 27.1 10.3 12.0 
 
 
Results from the Ranking Procedure in V1 are summarised in Table D2. Table D2 
captures patterns of the top lottery choices together with the values of r which 
correspond with indifference between adjacent options. For example, a CRRA 
individual for whom r = 1 would be indifferent between (£15, 0.5; £8, 0.5) and (£20, 
0.5; £6, 0.5) in DT14, while an individual for whom r = 0.6062 would be indifferent 
between (£20, 0.5; £6, 0.5) and (£25, 0.5; £4, 0.5). So if we find that someone ranks 
(£20, 0.5; £6, 0.5) as their top choice in DT14, we infer that their r lies somewhere 
between 1 and 0.6062. 
                                                 
26
 Note that according to the CRRA, an individual is risk seeking if r<0, risk neutral if r=0 and risk 
averse if r>0. We present the data according to three different categories (r<1, r=1, r>1) because in the 
Allocation Procedure participants who are risk seeking, risk neutral and slightly risk averse all may 
divide £20 by constantly betting all of their endowment on black. Therefore, in this case, the lack of 
stability of r can be better demonstrated by categories r<1, r=1, and r>1 than by categories r<0, r=0, 
and r>0. 
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Table D2 Top lottery choices in DT14 and DT15, subsample V1 
DT14 1
st
 Choice DT15 1
st
 Choice 
A: £10 for sure 70 118 A: £10 for sure 
B: £15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 28 22 B: £15, 0.3; £8, 0.7 
C: £20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 23 9 C: £20, 0.3; £6, 0.7 
D: £25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 13 2 D: £25, 0.3; £4, 0.7 
E: £30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 2 2 E: £30, 0.3; £2, 0.7 
F: £35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 36 19 F: £35, 0.3; £0, 0.7 
 
 
Given that in DT15 the EV advantage of the riskier options is greatly reduced, we 
should expect to see more safe choices than in DT14. On the one hand, we do 
observe more safe choices in DT15. However, it could be argued that the shift in the 
distribution should have been even stronger between DT14 and DT15. Given their 
choices in DT14, we may expect at least 136 individuals in V1 have r > 0.2334 and 
that all of these should opt for the sure £10 in DT15. Nevertheless, the shift is 
significant enough to support the claim that participants are sensitive to the change 
in parameters and for the most part react in the expected direction. 
 
A similar table can be compiled for V2 (see Table D3 below). 
 
Table D3 Top lottery choices in DT14 and DT15, subsample V2 
DT14 1
st
 Choice DT15 1st Choice 
A: £10 for sure 77 19 A: £10 for sure 
B: £15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 22 15 B: £12, 0.7; £8, 0.3 
C: £20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 26 67 C: £14, 0.7; £6, 0.3 
D: £25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 5 22 D: £16, 0.7; £4, 0.3 
E: £30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 4 16 E: £18, 0.7; £2, 0.3 
F: £35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 45 40 F: £20, 0.7; £0, 0.3 
 
As in V1, the distribution of V2 top choices in DT15 is different from the distribution 
of DT14 choices in the predicted direction. However, when we compare the two 
distributions, there are grounds for concern about the robustness of the estimates of 
r. For example, if the 77 individuals who chose the sure £10 option in DT14 all had r > 
2.958, we should have expected them either to choose the sure £10 in DT15 or else 
2.958 
1 
0.6062 
0.4089 
0.2334 
0.2137 
0.0753 
0.0457 
0.0309 
0.0182 
Value of 
r  
Value of 
r  
Value of 
r 
Value of 
r 
2.958 
1 
0.6062 
0.4089 
4.1492 
1.3562 
0.7638 
0.2334 
0.4808 
0.2491 
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choose the next safest option (£12, 0.7; £8, 0.3). But in fact only 21 of those 
individuals made those choices, while the other 56 spread (i.e., 39, 7, 5, 5) between 
the other four options. In short, the internal consistency of the ranking procedure 
based on the E&G question format is modest. 
 
Table D4 shows the distributions of r derived from participants’ decisions in the 
Choice List Procedure. This table reveals significant variability in the distributions of r 
between decision tasks. 
 
Furthermore, as shown in Table D5, the subsample mean and median estimates of r 
vary considerably between questions, with the subsample means varying from -
0.097 to 0.690 for V1 and from 0.185 to 0.661 for V2, while the subsample medians 
varied from 0.146 to 0.561 for V1 and from 0.146 to 0.789 for V2. Clearly, such data 
cast serious doubt on the idea that any one choice list question in conjunction with 
the CRRA assumption can produce estimates of r that transfer even to other choice 
list questions with rather different parameters.
27
 
 
What is not so readily apparent from these tables is the degree of variability at the 
individual level. However, if we compute the ranges and standard deviations of the 
values of r elicited from each participant, we find that the mean and median ranges 
were 1.225 and 1.013, while the mean and median within-person standard 
deviations were 0.491 and 0.420. In short, the data from the choice list tasks tell the 
same story as the data from the allocation tasks and from the ranking tasks: namely, 
that many individuals do not exhibit CRRA coefficients that are stable from one set of 
parameters to another, even within the same type of procedure.  
 
                                                 
27
 The analysis reported in Appendix D utilises the individual-level data. We have also conducted 
maximum likelihood estimations of representative agent data using expected utility theory with 
constant relative risk aversion. Our results at the representative level also show that participants are not 
consistent between different choice list talks in the experiment. These results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Table D4 Distributions of r derived from DT16 – DT20  
Sure/ 
Safer 
DT16 DT17 DT18 DT19 DT20 
V1 V2  * V1 V2  * V1 V2  * V1 V2  * V1 V2  * 
0 - - -  1 - -2.662  1 1 -1.949  1 - -1.727  2 1 -1.206  
1 3 - -8.959 1 1 -1.214 - 1 -1.441 - 2 -0.727 3 - -0.405 
2 1 - -2.143 4 6 -0.468 3 8 -1.006 6 4 -0.262 23 25 0 
3 17 4 -0.776 40 56 0.085 6 17 -0.607 40 40 0.044 42 21 0.297 
4 38 36 -0.186 59 55 0.561 31 47 -0.210 53 61 0.273 47 42 0.551 
5 53 57 0.146 38 36 1.012 62 59 0.495 32 38 0.456 31 43 0.789 
6 43 55 0.360 22 18 1.476 43 26 0.827 32 17 0.608 20 30 1.032 
7 13 21 0.513 4 6 2.000 26 20 2.288 5 11 0.738 3 12 1.305 
8 3 4 0.632 1 1 2.685 - - - 1 3 0.852 - 3 1.658 
9-10 1 2 ≥0.683 2 - ≥3.177 - - - 2 3 ≥0.904 1 2 ≥1.909 
 
* r coefficient at the point of indifference between two adjacent lotteries/options.  
 
-0.7066 -1.0959 -1.6835 
-0.1816 
0.1566 
0.4273 
0.6704 
0.9086 
1.1628 
1.4658 
1.9089 
-0.4650 
-0.0959 
0.1660 
0.3691 
0.5350 
0.6753 
0.7969 
0.9041 
-1.2172 
-0.8039 
-0.4105 
0 
0.4950 
1.3085 
-0.4322 
0 
0.2630 
0.4425 
0.5757 
0.6826 
-1.2892 
-3.8484 
-1.7633 
-0.8039 
-0.1774 
0.3287 
0.7870 
1.2395 
1.7260 
2.3113 
3.1771 
- 
- 
- 
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Table D5 Mean and median values of r derived from DT16 – DT20 
CRRA 
coefficient 
r 
DT16 DT17 DT18 DT19 DT20 
V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 
Mean -0.097 0.185 0.690 0.610 0.643 0.362 0.311 0.319 0.500 0.661 
Median 0.146 0.146 0.561 0.561 0.495 0.495 0.273 0.273 0.551 0.789 
 
(b) Between-procedural comparison 
 
• The Allocation Procedure and Choice List Procedure 
In the Choice List Procedure, the median individual standard deviation of r values is 
equal to 0.420. For the allocation procedure, the corresponding statistic is 0.465. To 
abstract from such within-person variability and focus on an individual-level ‘central 
tendency’ measure, we take, for each individual, the median values of r generated by 
each procedure
28
. We then regress the medians from the allocation procedure 
(MedAll) on the medians from the choice list procedure (MedChoi). If the two 
procedures produce individuals’ medians that are, on average, quite similar, we 
should expect the regression to yield an intercept close to zero and a slope that is 
not far from 1. 
 
Because of the significant differences between V1 and V2 distributions for three of 
the five choice list tasks, we run separate regressions for each subsample. The results 
(showing standard errors in brackets below each coefficient) are: 
 
V1: MedAll  =  0.919  +  0.370 MedChoi  R
2
 = 0.014 
  (0.126)    (0.239) 
V2: MedAll  =  0.778  +  1.084 MedChoi  R
2
 = 0.069 
 (0.158)    (0.300) 
 
In both cases the R
2
 is low, but especially in the V1 regression, where the intercept is 
significantly greater than 0 and the slope coefficient is significantly less than 1. There 
is at best only a very weak relationship between the two measures here. In the V2 
regression, the relationship is stronger – the slope coefficient is not significantly 
different from 1 – but the intercept is again significantly greater than 0, suggesting 
that the two elicitation procedures are liable to give substantially and systematically 
different CRRA measures
29
. Bearing in mind that we have tried to eliminate much of 
the within-procedure noise by using medians, the weakness and lack of agreement 
between the two sets of measures is discouraging. 
 
                                                 
28
 We take medians rather than means because some of the means were susceptible to influence from 
the occasional very high estimates of r generated by some people in some questions. 
29
 The fact that these two regressions are themselves rather different from one another reflects the way 
in which the responses to the choice list tasks were affected by reversing the top-to-bottom order in 
those tasks. 
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• The Ranking Procedure and Choice List Procedure 
To compare these two procedures we take individuals’ median values of r produced 
by the choice list procedure and translate these into the decision each individual 
would make in the first ranking task, DT14 (which is closest to the E&G (2002) 
procedure). For example, as shown in Tables D2 and D3, someone for whom 0.6062 
< r < 1 would rank (£20, 0.5; £6, 0.5) above all other options. By counting the 
numbers of individuals whose median r from the five choice list tasks lies in that 
range, we can infer the choice-list-based estimate of the frequency of those 
responses in DT14. And likewise for all of the other ranges of r. 
 
Table D6 compares the actual distributions of responses to DT14 for each subsample 
with the inferred distributions. For both subsamples, there are very clear differences 
between the actual distributions and those based on the choice list procedure. Most 
strikingly, the choice list task never produces a median r high enough to entail 
ranking the sure £10 option first and only seldom produces a median r greater than 
1, whereas the majority of individuals behave in the ranking task as if their values of 
r are greater than 1.  
 
Table D6 Actual vs Inferred Top Ranked Options in DT14 Based on the CRRA 
Coefficients from the Choice List Procedure 
 V1 Actual 
DT14 
V1 Inferred 
DT14 
 V2 Actual 
DT14 
V2 Inferred 
DT14 
£10 for sure 70 0  77 0 
£15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 28 5  22 9 
£20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 23 25  26 26 
£25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 13 62  5 54 
£30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 2 39  4 35 
£35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 36 40  45 55 
 
 
• Allocation Procedure and Ranking Procedure 
For these two procedures, we can repeat the comparison made in Table D6, but in 
this case we can infer the top ranked option from the median r derived from the 
allocation procedure. Since there were no significant differences between the 
subsamples in either of these procedures, we consider the pooled distributions in 
Table D7 below.  
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Table D7: Actual vs Inferred Top Ranked Options in DT14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because 150 respondents had a median value of r = 1 in the allocation procedure, at 
which value someone would be indifferent between the second and third listed 
options, we have divided those individuals equally between each of those two 
options. However, it is clear that whatever way those 150 are divided, the actual 
distribution is significantly different from whatever might be inferred from the 
allocation procedure. In particular, the most extreme available options were actually 
selected by 228 (65.0%) of the sample whereas only 21 (6.0%) would have ranked 
them first on the basis of their median response to DT1-DT13. 
 
The allocation procedure seems to pull responses towards r = 1, while the ranking 
procedure appears to encourage behaviour which results in more extreme (in both 
directions) values of r. 
 
To sum up, we observe very weak consistency in the coefficients of CRRA within 
procedures and almost no consistency between procedures. Of course, these results 
may suggest that the CRRA specification is not a good way to represent participants’ 
risk attitudes and that other functional forms might work better. Yet, our analysis 
presented in the main body of the paper makes us sceptical about the chances of 
success within the usual EUT set of options, because even the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients, although statistically significant, are often quite low. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Actual 
DT14 
Inferred from 
Allocation 
 
A: £10 for sure 147 10  
B: £15, 0.5; £8, 0.5 50 150  (75 + 75) 
C: £20, 0.5; £6, 0.5 49 138  (63 + 75) 
D: £25, 0.5; £4, 0.5 18 25  
E: £30, 0.5; £2, 0.5 6 17  
F: £35, 0.5; £0, 0.5 81 11  
